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There can be no doubt there is serious
resistance to evolutionary psychology (EP)
as a theoretical paradigm from both
within the field (e.g., social psychol-
ogy) and in other disciplines (e.g., social
sciences). Numerous researchers (Harris,
2003; Eastwick et al., 2014) appear to have
made it their objective to show how pre-
dictions made and studies conducted by
evolutionary psychologists are flawed (and
even outright sexist). Such research pro-
grams have left evolutionary psychologists
scratching their heads with the simple, yet
fundamental question of why is everyone
not an evolutionary psychologist?
Darren Burke (DB) details institutional
biases in promoting evolutionary sciences.
In the United States this shows itself in
the debate about teaching Creationism
or Intelligent Design in schools as an
apparently reasonable effort to be bal-
anced. Ironically, evolved mechanisms for
extended collaborative actions with kin
and non-kin to exploit resources may
be responsible for financial, political, and
intellectual collusions to maintain the very
belief systems that spawned them. These
may create institutional blocks in terms
of funding, publishing, and hiring prac-
tices. As academics trained in psychology
as well as biology and anthropology, we
focus on individual-level obstacles to com-
plement DB’s position. We focus on the
potential psychological reasons behind the
resistance to EP.
We contend there are essentially four
different types of psychological resistance
to EP, all of which are a function of an
individual’s philosophical belief systems,
whether they are implicit or explicit. The
biases are not unique to mainstream psy-
chology or even researchers but, instead,
may be endemic in people, more gener-
ally. We focus our attention on researchers
because we wish to draw attention to biases
in those who have been educated to be less
biased. This is not to say we are not biased
in our own way. We, like most evolution-
ary psychologists, assume human beings
are part of the natural world; the only
explanations worth attending to are natu-
ralistic; and the brain (and all that comes
from it) is a naturally occurring, evolved
aspect of humans. Assumptions pervade
all of science, what matters is holding the
fewest and most reasonable assumptions
possible. We feel the theory of evolution
offers just that, but there may be a series of
psychological blocks that exclude individ-
uals from thinking clearly about evolution




The first, most obvious objection stems
from the denial of evolution en toto. Such
beliefs normally stem from religious beliefs
about the nature of the universe, human’s
place it in, and the active effort to main-
tain those beliefs. Many liberal and famous
academics (e.g., Stephen Jay Gould) walk
the line between belief in the supernat-
ural/metaphysical and science by arguing
that science and religion deal with “non-
overlapping magisteria” (Gould, 1998,
p. 274). This political view is functional
for many scientists who, for want of pro-
tecting their own beliefs (often implicitly),
protecting their own reputation, ensuring
they do not lose their jobs, and securing
funding from government agencies who
are likely staffed by people who funda-
mentally disagree with all things related
to evolution, may steer away from such
topics or paradigms. However, psycholog-
ical science (in particular) does overlap
with questions of moral value and rea-
soning, and some religious claims overlap
with scientific empiricism. Objections to
the evolutionary study of human behavior,
from this perspective, are hard to over-
come because the motivation behind the
denial stems from a (perceived) need to
protect one’s values and morals. If science
is a pursuit of empirical evidence to sup-
port or falsify predictions derived from
theory there can be no doubt that natural-
istic predictions, derived from evolution-
ary theory are not only sound but must
have relevance to human beings.
HUMAN EXCEPTIONALISM
The second philosophical objection cen-
ters around a Spencerian version of
the Darwin-Wallace theory of evolution.
Many psychological and social scientists
accept the theory of evolution in princi-
ple but deny that it is relevant to study-
ing human cognition or behavior (i.e.,
Cartesian Dualism). Many can accept that
our bipedal gate, relative hairlessness, or
cranial structures have evolved through
natural/sexual selection, but an applica-
tion of the same principles to human
behavior receives a vehement rejection.
This position has implicitly haunted psy-
chology for decades and we can see it today
in the constant attempts to define what
makes humans special relative to other
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animals (e.g., language; Pinker, 1994;
culture; Henrich and McElreath, 2003;
play; Maestripieri, 2012) and the implicit
belief that the human brain needs its
own science that is separate from biology.
While these objections do not necessarily
come from a religious background, there
is an underlying sense that a naturalis-
tic approach to human behavior threat-
ens existing views of morals or ethics (see
Curry, 2006).
ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM
The third philosophical objection comes
from those who may allow biology some
role in explaining human behavior but the
role is extremely limited. The obvious one
of relevance comes in many names: The
Standard Social Sciences Model, Tabula
Rasa, and Environmental Determinism.
All of these hold at their core the per-
sonal, political, or professional “need”
to believe that human beings are more
a product of environmental influences
than evolved differences (see Genetic
Determinism below). This ideology was
most strongly expressed in behaviorism
but still is predominant in social psy-
chology textbooks and conferences. For
instance, Worchel and Cooper (1976) say
that “social psychology is the study of the
way in which individuals are affected by
social situations” (p. 7) and Shaver (1977)
says social psychology is “the scientific
study of the personal and situational fac-
tors that affect individual social behavior”
(p. 14). This bias in focusing on the envi-
ronmental, social, or cultural causes of
human behavior is functional in that it
allows researchers to suggest ways we can
change behavior. This position is not all
bad, except it leads to a pure focus on
proximate mechanisms. This is not to say
that all behaviors have ultimate, evolu-
tionary causes, but an understanding of
the potential ultimate functions of vari-
ous aspects of human nature can lead to
an even better understanding of how to
change behavior. Nevertheless, in both
cases researchers need to be more critical
about understanding their topic of inter-
est in macroscopic and microscopic levels
(Bingham and Souza, 2009).
GENETIC DETERMINISM
Not only is there a gross misunderstanding
of the theory of evolution (and its
application to human behavior), but also
there seems to be an active bias against
learning about genetics and comparative
biology. These “inferential prisons” leave
researchers hard-pressed to explain many
observed effects (e.g., twin concordance
in personality; Vernon et al., 2008) and
they are at a disadvantage compared to
evolutionary psychologists whose mod-
els are expressly about the interaction of
the person and the environment. EP and
related disciplines like evolutionary devel-
opmental psychology (Evo Devo) ARE
environmentalist disciplines. Take as an
example the research on kin recognition
and incest avoidance (Lieberman et al.,
2007). The authors propose an innate
learning process which, helps us deter-
mine who our siblings are (and there-
fore who to help and who not to mate
with) through the length of sibling co-
residence and the other child’s perinatal
association with one’s mother. The degree
to which these “environmental” factors are
present depends on whether the individ-
ual is an older or younger sibling. A sec-
ond born will of course not be exposed
to cues of her sibling’s perinatal associa-
tion with their mother but will have cues
to co-residence if she is raised with her sib-
ling. This research is consistent with the
Westermark hypothesis (1981), which fell
out of favor in the 20th century partially
because the SSSM belief that behavior
is predominately environmentally deter-
mined. But if an evolutionary approach
is consistent with environmental determi-
nants of human behavior then why do
many psychologists have issues with the
discipline? The difference is that many
social psychologists hold an implicit belief
in a version of tabula rasa, or general pur-
pose learning in humans (Lieberman and
Symons, 1998). The Westermark hypoth-
esis, like discussion of kin recognition
mechanisms, leads many to think of genet-
ically determined, automatic systems that
tell us exactly who we are related to. This
could not be farther from what the com-
parative biologists and evolutionary psy-
chologists are arguing. Our brains estimate
relatedness based on cues (environmental
contingencies) that must be experienced
through development (learning). The end
result is not perfect knowledge of who we
are related to, but best guesses based on
available information that, on average over
time, would have lead us to make decisions
that increased inclusive fitness. We would
argue that these specific cues and their spe-
cific effects on sibling altruism and incest
aversion could only have been predicted
from a perspective taking the evolved func-
tion of kin recognition into account.
DB argues for increased training
in evolutionary theory, which logically
should temper many of the objections
to evolutionary approaches to psychol-
ogy. However, we suggest that attention
should be paid to the underlying moti-
vations behind the critiques from social
scientists. As long as EP is perceived to
threaten political (e.g., men and women
should be equal), moral (e.g., humans
should be inherently nice), professional
(e.g., all behavior is changeable), and reli-
gious (e.g., God created us in our present,
immutable form) belief systems, the cog-
nitive biases underlying those systems will
act to preserve them. We fear that without
the anchor that is Evolutionary Theory
(see Confer et al., 2010), psychology as
a science will continue to pitch and yaw
through the sea.
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